

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

16.530

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director
 FROM : Secretariat
 SUBJECT: Field Report of Lt. Tom Stix, SI/MedTO

~~SECRET~~
 Field Report
 DATE: 29 May 1945

X STIX

1. Lt. Stix was stationed on the Island of Euboea, the point from which SI and MO missions were infiltrated into Central Greece.

2. He states that no attempt was made to train him as an individual for a specific job. Lt. Stix suggests that more emphasis be placed on compatibility of members of a field team and that SI missions be continually supplied with equipment, food, etc., if they are to get maximum cooperation from guerrilla forces.

cr c

W. B. Kantack
 W. B. Kantack
 Capt., A.C.
 Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS
FROM : Chief, SI
SUBJECT: Field Report - Lieutenant Tom Stix

DATE: 23 March 1945

*Field Report 16,530
Stix, Tom
Lieutenant Stix
A. C. T.*

There is submitted herewith the field report of
Lieut. Tom Stix.

Whitney H. Shepardson
Whitney H. Shepardson

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI

FROM : D. DeBardleben

SUBJECT: Report submitted by 1st Lieutenant Tom Stix,

DATE: 16 March 1948

The principal difficulties (pages 2, 3, 4, 5) encountered by Lt. Stix involved training, personnel and supply. His mild criticisms appear to be valid. In reply, it is fair to state that the experiences of Stix and others have proved invaluable lessons to SI and because of these experiences numerous delinquencies will be avoided in the future.

D. DeB.
D. DeB.

SECRET

REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS

by

1st Lieutenant Tom Stix
(Greek Desk)INDEX

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS
Through Chief, SI

FROM : Tom Stix, 1st Lieutenant, AUS

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

DATE: 16 March 1945

1. Personnel and Itinerary

The original personnel of the mission consisted of a radio operator, an interpreter, and myself. Two months after reaching the field I was joined by a civilian agent. The mission left Alexandria 28 May 1944 by oaique, and after delays at Cyprus and Smyrna, reached the island of Euboea on 5 July. We continued to operate on the island until 12 October 1944.

2. Summary of Mission Activities

The island of Euboea was used primarily as a point from which SI and MO missions could be infiltrated into central Greece and mail brought in and out. Two Americans went to the island several months earlier to lay the ground work for this activity and then came out again. This was followed up by a Greek agent working for our services, but because of difficulties in relations between the Americans, the British, and the local andartes, it was thought advisable to have a "100% American" mission on the spot. Our mission immediately contacted and established friendly relations with the Headquarters of the 7th ELAS Regiment, and with their help established a base, and secured transport and guides for future missions. Mail and money to and from Athens, Karpenisi, and Mt. Parnassos was handled and the later agents were successfully passed through.

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In addition, an observation post was set up on the Euboea Channel to relay shipping intelligence by radio. During the period we were there, we travelled over most of the island, sending back military, political and economic reports to Cairo.

3. Specific Difficulties Encountered in the Field which Might be Improved

a. Training

My training consisted of five days at the Middle East School and three weeks close contact with the Greek desk - reading back files and familiarising myself with current conditions in Greece. From a practical standpoint, the time spent at the school was largely wasted. The instruction was general and directed at the "lowest common denominator." There was no attempt to train me as an individual for my specific job. Although Mr. Young, Captain Else, and Captain Edson of the Greek Desk could not have been more helpful in answering specific questions and solving specific difficulties, they did not have time to give me adequate individual briefing and I was too inexperienced to bring up certain problems which later arose in the field. Among these were the past experiences and difficulties of British and American missions in Evvia; the general areas of political intelligence which while new to me were "old hat" to the office, the specific form to be used in shipping intelligence and what types of ships to look for in the Aegean, and such

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small items as the preferred forms for radio messages. None of these matters in themselves were serious handicaps but advance briefing on them would have improved my reporting considerably.

b. Personnel

Since neither the interpreter nor operator selected for my mission were in Cairo, I had no opportunity to meet them before the mission got under way. When I reached Turkey I discovered that the interpreter felt it would be dangerous for him to stay in EAM territory because of his associations on a previous mission and my operator had been allocated elsewhere. Since I was anxious to avoid further delay, I accepted the only two men available on the spot and started off. This proved to be a mistake. The interpreter was a rabid communist whose loyalty was to EAM rather than to the U. S. When he discovered that the mission was not going to act as an organ to propagandize America for EAM, he deserted. The radio operator had already failed on two previous missions and his personality was unsuitable for field work. Although the office in no way insisted on my taking these men and they only became part of the mission by force of circumstances, their previous records were such that in my opinion they should not have been permitted to go into the field, even if I were willing to take the chance. From this experience, I believe that in the future more

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emphasis should be placed on compatibility of members of a field team - Living under isolated and difficult conditions, congeniality and a willingness to work together can often overcome technical deficiencies, but technical ability alone can not insure a successful mission.

c. Operational

(1) Supply

The chief operational difficulty was that caiques could only land at one port and I had to meet each one. This necessitated dropping whatever I was doing at the time and sometimes involved round trips of as much as 100 miles. Often caiques would be delayed and several days would have to be wasted at the port. The arrival of Mr. Calvocoressi September 1, greatly ameliorated this situation, as it enabled us to "trade off" when caiques had to be met. Calvocoressi's abilities as an intelligence officer and his knowledge of Greek and Greeks proved invaluable in accomplishing the latter part of the mission's work.

(2) Liaison

The chief obstacle to successful liaison with the andartes was the question of supplies. Local ground rules forbade SA missions to distribute arms.....the No. 1 guerrilla priority - Naturally, it was difficult to justify this policy, even though it was made

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perfectly clear to the Andartes leaders at the outset. To compensate, it was determined to send in shoes, clothing, medicine, and food all of which were urgently needed. The first caique brought in a good supply and was enthusiastically received. As a result, the arrival of an American caique became a regimental event. Consequently, when the next two caiques arrived virtually empty, there was great disappointment and it made it correspondingly more difficult to ask favors from the regiment. I do not wish to infer that Americans were not welcome for their own sake, but the military and local population were desperately short of basic necessities, and we were their only hope of securing them. The Andartes never failed to supply the mission willingly with mules, guides, and even boats when requested, and they not unreasonably hoped for material return. Since American propaganda continually stressed the vast supplies going overseas, it was hard to explain why it was so difficult to secure even a few hundred pairs of shoes or a surgical kit. If SI missions wish to get the most out of guerrilla forces they should not rely on good will alone, but should be continually supplied. Regularity is even more important than quantity.

4. Unique Characteristics of Greek SI Desk

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The nucleus of the Greek Desk was a group of men who had been friends before the war, respected each other's abilities and were deeply interested in Greece. Newcomers were indoctrinated with this feeling of mutual loyalty and whether it was Cairo, Cyprus, Izmir, or Athens, the spirit was catching and immeasurably contributed to the successful operations of the Greek Desk.

Tom Stix
Tom Stix
1st Lieutenant, AUS

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : Secretariat
 SUBJECT: Field Report of L. Cabot Briggs

DATE: 5 April 1945

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1. Attached is a report from Mr. L. Cabot Briggs who was recruited by the Security Branch and later worked for SI in North Africa. In this report Mr. Briggs describes his work in organizing agent chains and the coverage which they achieved. In addition, Mr. Briggs discusses his relations with various French and U.S. agencies.

2. Mr. Briggs makes the following recommendations concerning conditions in the field:

- a. expanding coverage in the field using two or three men in Algeria, one of these men to be "open."
- b. setting up a financial and supply service.
- c. more care in providing for the families of agents.

3. Mr. Briggs was apparently inconvenienced by not being paid for some time. (In a covering memorandum Mr. Boulton notes that this was due to the delay in returning Mr. Briggs to this country.)

4. Mr. Boulton's memorandum recommends that Mr. Briggs be transferred to SI and returned to Algiers by the beginning of May.

W. B. Kantack
 W. B. Kantack
 Capt., A.C.
 Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS
FROM : Chief, SI
SUBJECT: Field Report - L. Cabot Briggs

DATE:

25 March 1945

We are attaching herewith the field report submitted
by L. Cabot Briggs.

Whitney H. Shepardson
Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI
via Executive Officer, SI

FROM : Divisional Deputy, SI, Africa Division

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions by L. Cabot Briggs

DATE: 21 March 1945

1. Shortly after the subject arrived in Algiers he was loaned to SI for an indefinite period for operational purposes but retained by Security for administrative purposes. This was incorporated in a written agreement of 28 November 1944 between the SI Branch and the Security Office.

2. With reference to paragraph 10 in the subject's report, no operational funds beyond those advanced by Leland Rounds, Oran, were sent him, since orders for his return were issued by this office on 16 January 1945. The lag between issuance of orders for his return and his arrival was due, as you know, to failure by Caserta to effect cabled instructions.

3. During the subject's recent residence in Algiers, he filed reports of increasingly good quality. These reports, as well as recommendations from Leland Rounds, to whom the subject was responsible, together with conversations which I have had with the subject, make it evident that he has available in Algiers a number of very useful contacts capable of being organized into a well integrated, productive chain. These contacts resulted from his undercover work in North Africa for the Security Office during the previous year.

4. It is recommended that he be transferred from the Security Office to the SI Branch and returned to his station in Algiers to arrive about the first of May. He would have open SI status, i.e., similar to that of Leland Rounds, with communications via the American Consul. Subject's relations with the American Consul are apparently on a firm basis due to services rendered by subject to the Consul.

5. In view of recent developments in Algiers and the importance of this post, it is imperative that it be covered at once, and this solution represents the most practical way of doing this with the minimum of delay.



R. Boulton

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- Paragraph 1 - Preliminary Groundwork.
- Paragraph 2 - Coverage of Arab Nationalist Movements.
- Paragraph 3 - Coverage of The French Administration
- Paragraph 4 - Coverage of the Black Market Transactions in genuine and Counterfeit American paper Currency and Gold.
- Paragraph 5 - Coverage of the Economic Situation.
- Paragraph 6 - My operating Procedure.
- Paragraph 7 - Improvement of Coverage.
- Paragraph 8 - Improvement of Servicing the Field.
- Paragraph 9 - General Difficulties in the Field.
- Paragraph 10 - Personal Difficulties in the Field.
- Paragraph 11 - Stranded Families of French SI Personnel
- Paragraph 12 - Suggestions for the Future.

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120 March 1945

SUBJECT : Report on Field Activities

TO : The Director

FROM : L. Cabot Briggs

1. From my arrival in Algiers in October 1943, to my departure in July 1944, for the landing in Southern France, I was engaged in security work, in the course of which I built up a general information chain in Algiers for the purpose of detecting leaks of information concerning contemplated operations. Thus, when I began straight SI work in December 1944, under the direction of Leland Rogers, I had a good foundation on which to begin building. Since the first of this year when I received formal notice of my transfer on loan from Security to SI, North African Section, I have devoted most of my efforts to building up my chain and expanding my coverage.
2. Since the various Arab Nationalist movements are generally considered the most critical problem in Algeria, I have given them priority thus far. As a result, I am now in a position where I know at least as much about the question as do the French authorities and there, in matters that must inevitably come to their attention sooner or later, I am on the average, a good week ahead of them. On the other hand, my coverage is still uneven among the different groups, especially in their branches in the interior. This condition can be cleared, at least in its broader outlines, in another six months: it is only a matter of time. The American Consul General in Algiers has been leaning on me heavily for late for information regarding the natives and the French Administration, and has expressed both complete satisfaction with the help I have given him thus far, and the hope that I will be able to carry on as soon as possible along the same lines.
3. The French Government in North Africa is still in the state of flux with many collaborationists and opportunists remaining in power, in spite of the fact that it is dominated by men drawn from the Free French. I have established contacts through which I am in extremely close touch with the developments in this quarter.

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One of these men should be "open", that is, he should make no attempt to conceal his ~~status~~ as a representative of the American Government and/or the Armed Forces, although his connection with OSS might well get the soft pedal. Some sort of known official connection is essential, if only as a door opener. I believe that my present work for OSS is quite unknown to the French, who think I have been left behind to clean up loose ends left by our departing army. The second man should be strictly undercover, either in business or in the consulate; it should be very advantageous to have both. All three should have their Headquarters in Algiers. One or two of these men should set up chains with sub-agents or cut-outs in important spots outside the city of Algiers such as Biskra, Annaba, Médéa, Blida.

8. The other important improvement would consist in setting up financial and supply services. Supplies should include such items as liquor, cigarettes, clothing, flashlight batteries, shoes, etc., to be used as presents for people who cannot be paid in money (as most of mine cannot), as well as the usual office supplies, arms, automobile accessories, electric light bulbs, etc. Some of the latter are useful also as presents, being unobtainable locally.
9. I was aware of no difficulties in the field from the general SI point of view, except that progress toward a clear cut program was slow in Washington, and I was slowed up in proportion. Relations with the Consulate, the French (both official and unofficial) and the various Allied military establishments were excellent, with all cooperating to the fullest extent that could be reasonably expected.
10. My personal difficulties were mostly financial. I have received no pay since September 1944, and only \$900.00 in operational funds which were given me by Leland Bonds. On this and my personal resources, I have done the work above outlined and maintained myself, my small office, a car and a chauffeur (an excellent man who has worked for us since before the landing in North Africa). Also, I was unable to draw any army rations (except PX supplies) because the military command forbade the opening of new accounts at the ration bank.
11. A serious problem exists in the form of wives and children of agents who remained when their husbands were parachuted into France, and are still there. The French Desk, SI, promised them that they would be sent to France as soon as possible and that pay-

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
ments to them would continue in the meantime. Payments were stopped as of 31 December 1944 by order of Captain Crockett, acting on instructions from Mr. Hyde through 2nd Lt., Sichel. However, the women in question were never warned in advance nor were they ever told why it was done. Thus, they find themselves high and dry and in exceedingly unfriendly state of mind. I have reported this situation to Captain Crockett, Mr. Hyde and Major Crosby, but it's worth repeating so that steps can be taken to avoid similar occurrences in the future.

12. In my point of view, we have gotten off to a very good, if somewhat slow, start in Algeria. I would recommend that we continue along the same lines with improvements as outlined above. I believe that quick action in speeding up the servicing of our service there will pay dividends in proportion. It would be helpful to know just how big a machine we want to set up and how long we intend to keep it running.

L. Cabot Briggs

L. CABOT BRIGGS

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director of Strategic Services
 Via: Chief, R & A, and Secretariat
 FROM : Capt. William A. Salant *W. A. S.*
 SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

DATE: 23 March 1945

The following report is submitted in accordance with
 General Order No. 63:

1. Description of Overseas Assignments.

(a) Dates: 24 Nov 1942 - 20 Nov 1943.

Place: London, England

Assignment: Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU),
 Economic Warfare Division, U.S. Embassy.

Duties: Strategic Target Analysis for 8th A.A.F.

(b) Dates: 2 Dec 1943 - 31 Aug 1944, and
 22 Sept 1944 - 18 Feb 1945.

Place: La Marsa, Tunisia, and Caserta, Italy.

Assignment: Attached to Headquarters, Mediterranean
 Allied Air Forces.

Duties: Strategic target analysis for MAAF and
 15th A.A.F. Work included frequent
 consultation with A-2, 15th A.A.F., analysis
 of strategic targets and target systems,
 direction, through intelligence requisitions,
 of sources of primary intelligence
 on strategic targets (photo recon, prisoner-
 of-war interrogation, and secret intelligence),
 and liaison with EOU, London.

(c) Dates: 1 Sept - 21 Sept 1944.

Place: Bucharest

Assignment: OSS R & A Intelligence gathering team.

Duties: Procurement of intelligence on bombing
 of Ploesti oil refineries and other air
 force operations in Rumania, and other
 intelligence of operational value to
 Allied military forces.

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Director of Strategic Services
23 March 1945
Page Two

2. Conditions in Field.

Conditions in field were, in general, excellent, and no improvements affecting operation of target analysis groups are suggested. Working relations of these groups with air forces in the theatre were close, harmonious, and mutually beneficial.

With respect to other OSS activities in the theatre, the writer is able to testify from personal experience to the validity of a principle that is already well known: that activity of branches procuring military intelligence should be geared as closely as possible to the armed forces operating in the theatre. In the field of strategic target intelligence, as in other fields, the usefulness of an intelligence source is immeasurably increased if the source receives adequate direction and guidance. As members of OSS who make use, in their daily work, of all types of target intelligence and are thoroughly familiar with target intelligence requirements, the target analysis groups have been in a peculiarly fortunate position to submit requests to OSS intelligence sources and to observe the results. They have been repeatedly impressed by the superiority of directed over undirected intelligence, and by the improvement that was observed whenever a previously undirected source received adequate briefing.

3. Specific Difficulties.

No specific difficulties were observed.

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16.536

Director of Strategic Services
 Via: Chief, R & A, and Secretariat
 Capt. William A. Salant

23 March 1945

Report on Field Conditions

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Director of Strategic Services
23 March 1945
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
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Maj. Gen. William Donovan
 Via: Dr. William A. Langer
 FROM : Lt. (j.g.) B.M. Bowie

DATE: 20 March 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Overseas Service

Field Report 16, 557
Summit, B.M. (C. 10)
1. Summary

1. The following comprises an itinerary of my tour of duty overseas, with description of the type of work performed at each station:

(a) Arrived at Algiers, 8 December 1943. Was briefed here for further duty in Italy.

(b) Arrived at San Severo, Italy, 27 December 1943, via La Marsa in Tunisia. Was assigned to the Mediterranean Allied Photo Reconnaissance Wing, the headquarters of which was at San Severo, to act as a liaison officer between OSS and MAPRW. My responsibilities were the coordination of air and ground intelligence in an attempt to preclude OSS agents or other informants risking their lives to get information more easily and more accurately gathered by photo reconnaissance. I further handled OSS requests for photo cover and saw to it that OSS intelligence reached the proper persons engaged in photo interpretation. This liaison work was substantially completed by February 1944.

(c) Arrived in Caserta, 20 February 1944. Assigned to the OSS group working in the target intelligence section of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, whose HQ was at Caserta. Also did a certain amount of target work for SO on objectives in Northern Italy. My main job, however, consisted of regular airforce target analysis gathering and interpreting secret intelligence on airforce objectives, examining and "laying on" photo reconnaissance, and writing recommendations on target priorities and policies.

(d) Arrived at Bari, 8 July 1944. This move was to join the target analysis section of the 15th Airforce in Bari. The work was very similar to that we performed at MAAF, though on a somewhat more operational level. Liaison continued to be maintained with the other OSS men at MAAF.

(e) Arrived at Bucharest, 29 August 1944. This move was undertaken by me to: (1) gather target intelligence from German and Rumanian documents; (2) interrogate German and Rumanian prisoners and officials for target information; (3) examine Ploesti and other airforce targets in Rumania for bomb damage assessment; (4) assist in the evacuation of Allied airmen. is

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Maj. Gen. William Donovan
20 March 1945
Page Two

I remained in Rumania until February 1945, I also came to do a certain amount of political reporting as well.

(f) Arrived in Washington, D.C., on 20 February 1945.

2. As to "conditions in the field that might be improved", I have no recommendations to make, since those with which I was most immediately concerned were good. I was aware of a certain amount of disorganization and confusion in allied fields of OSS work in Italy, but since I was not personally involved in this work, but spent nearly all my time with the air forces, I do not consider myself competent to make any analysis or suggestions for improvement. The conditions of our work with MAPRW, MAAF, and the 15th Airforce were always, physically and socially, unexceptionable. In Bucharest, OSS conditions, morale, and efficiency were generally high.

3. As to "specific difficulties encountered", I recall none of an organizational nature. I do not believe that the nature or value of the work our group was doing with the air forces--specifically, the achievements of Lt. Coombs, Lt. Dorr, and Capt. Salant--were ever either well understood or much appreciated by the command in Italy; but at least we were allowed to operate without interference or intrusion, and in general were permitted an unusual freedom of action which was both welcome and useful.

B. M. Bowie
B. M. Bowie,
Lt. (j.g.) USNR

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Maj. Gen. William Donovan
 Via: Dr. William A. Langer
 Lt. (j.g.) B.M. Bowie

20 March 1945

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Maj. Gen. William Donovan
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B. M. Box
Lt. (j.g.) USNR

CONFIDENTIAL

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Maj. Gen. William Donovan
Via: Dr. William A. Langer
Lt. (J.G.) B.M. Howie

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(b) Arrived at San Severo, Italy, 27 December 1943, via La Marsa in Tunisia. Was assigned to the Mediterranean Allied Photo Reconnaissance Wing, the headquarters of which was at San Severo, to act as a liaison officer between OSS and MAPRW. My responsibilities were the coordination of air and ground intelligence in an attempt to preclude OSS agents or other informants risking their lives to get information more easily and more accurately gathered by photo reconnaissance. I further handled OSS requests for photo cover and saw to it that OSS intelligence reached the proper persons engaged in photo interpretation. This liaison work was substantially completed by February 1944.

(c) Arrived in Caserta, 30 February 1944. Assigned to the OSS group working in the target intelligence section of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, whose HQ was at Caserta. Also did a certain amount of target work for 80 on objectives in Northern Italy. My main job, however, consisted of regular airforce target analysis gathering and interpreting secret intelligence on airforce objectives, examining and "laying on" photo reconnaissance, and writing recommendations on target priorities and policies.

(d) Arrived at Bari, 8 July 1944. This move was to join the target analysis section of the 15th Airforce in Bari. The work was very similar to that we performed at MAAP, though on a somewhat more operational level. Liaison continued to be maintained with the other OSS men at MAAP.

(e) Arrived at Bucharest, 29 August 1944. This move was undertaken by me to: (1) gather target intelligence from German and Rumanian documents; (2) interrogate German and Rumanian prisoners and officials for target information; (3) examine Ploesti and other airforce targets in Rumania for bomb damage assessment; (4) assist in the evacuation of Allied airmen. As

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Maj. Gen. William Donovan
20 March 1945
Page Two

I remained in Rumania until February 1945, I also came to do a certain amount of political reporting as well.

(f) Arrived in Washington, D.C., on 20 February 1945.

2. As to "conditions in the field that might be improved", I have no recommendations to make, since those with which I was most immediately concerned were good. I was aware of a certain amount of disorganization and confusion in allied fields of OSS work in Italy, but since I was not personally involved in this work, but spent nearly all my time with the air forces, I do not consider myself competent to make any analysis or suggestions for improvement. The conditions of our work with MAPNW, MAAP, and the 15th Airforce were always, physically and socially, unexceptionable. In Bucharest, OSS conditions, morale, and efficiency were generally high.

3. As to "specific difficulties encountered", I recall none of an organizational nature. I do not believe that the nature or value of the work our group was doing with the air forces--specifically, the achievements of Lt. Coombs, Lt. Dorr, and Capt. Salant--were ever either well understood or much appreciated by the command in Italy; but at least we were allowed to operate without interference or intrusion, and in general were permitted an unusual freedom of action which was both welcome and useful.

B. M. Howie,
Lt. (J.G.) USMC

CONFIDENTIAL

OSS Form 10840

DATE 3 April

TO Bygones

There seems nothing
worth mentioning in the
attached for index card purposes -

TV

FROM:

(328.16)

EXT.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
via Dr. William L. Langer and Secretariat

FROM : Wilfred Malenbaum *Wm*

SUBJECT: Report on Field Trip - 14 December 1944-11 February 1945
(Prepared in conformance with General Order No. 63 Revised,
14 March 1945)

DATE: 23 March 1945

A. This trip was undertaken to facilitate R & A activities overseas in the field of food and agriculture and to improve the effectiveness of the use of material in this field in operating programs to which R & A contributes in Washington. This mission was advocated by Mr. H. W. Parisius, Director, Office of Food Programs, FEA; it was also supported by officials in WSA and UNRRA. Its specific objective was to consult with various G-5 groups operating in the field, to indicate to them the kinds of information needed for operating purposes in Washington; to arrange for coordinated work by American personnel, of whatever agency, in order to improve the reporting and servicing in the food and agricultural field.

My time was spent in the following ways:

1. 15 December-31 December -- London: working with US Group CC and the Combined Working Party. While there I prepared a preliminary appraisal of the 1944-45 crops and food prospects for European countries on the basis of all information available to all research groups, US-UK and other governments (in London).
2. 1-5 January; 9-12 January -- Paris and Versailles: in consultation with G-5 SHAEF (Main), G-5 Com Z, British, French, and US agricultural, food and shipping officials. Arrangements were made for continued coordinated reporting on current French food developments.
3. 6 January-8 January -- Brussels: in consultation with G-5 SHAEF, Belgian Mission: Belgian, British, Dutch agricultural officials. Material was collected here for the preparation of an analysis of the current Belgian food and agricultural prospects; similarly for Holland. Arrangements were also initiated for continued reporting for general Washington availability of current food and agricultural developments.
4. 14 January-24 January -- Rome, Caserta, and Naples: in consultation G-5, AFHQ; Agricultural and Food Subcommittees, ACC; Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Food, Italian Government; UNRRA officials. These discussions covered problems of food and agriculture in Italy and all the Balkans. Arrangements

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

were made for current coverage of developments in these fields in Italy, particularly non-liberated Italy, and in the various Balkan countries. Preparation was made for sending certain personnel into the Balkans to facilitate in this assignment.

5. 25 January-29 January -- Nancy and Epinal: in consultation with G-5, Third and Seventh Armies. Discussions involved civilian supply programs in areas in Southeastern France and in preparation for the program in Germany. Arrangements were made for flow of material via Paris to London and Washington.

6. 29 January-31 January -- Paris: completed discussions with General Scowden and the US Embassy officials for collection and flow of material.

7. 1 February-8 February -- London: reporting on observations and accomplishments to OSS, WSA, UNRRA, and MEA. Discussions with British and American agencies on continuation of Combined Working Party program; arrangements with US Group and UK Group CC for use of additional professional personnel in this field to be supplied by OSS and MEA.

8. On the trip, I noted no conditions in OSS that might be improved, nor was I aware of specific difficulties. It should be pointed out that the bulk of my time was spent away from OSS establishments.

Walter Hallendorn

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIALOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.16567
8 April 1945
ETO

To: General William J. Donovan, Director OSS

Thru: Deputy Director Services & Chief Finance Branch

From: Frank P. Bishop, Chief Civilian Personnel & Fiscal Section, ETO

The following report is submitted in accordance with instructions contained in General Order 63 issued 14 March 1945:

Writer has been serving in the capacity of Chief of the Civilian Personnel and Fiscal Sections ETO since April 1944. Responsible for maintenance of vouchered funds accounts and budgets, certification and expenditure of vouchered funds, and handling of civilian personnel and related activities in the ETO.

In performing above duties writer has experienced excellent cooperation and valuable guidance from the ETO Services Officer, Personnel Officer, and Special Funds Officer, and satisfactory cooperation from Branch Chiefs and Branch Administrative Officers in ETO.

Finance

The service, cooperation and guidance received from the Washington Finance Branch has been satisfactory in every respect. Routine fiscal matters have been handled efficiently and on a current basis and this Branch has been prompt and considerate in answering correspondence and giving decisions and advice whenever problems were presented.

Personnel

Up until about three months ago some difficulty was experienced in the ETO in connection with routine matters pertaining to civilian personnel, due primarily to the slowness of the Washington office in taking actions, and the apparent lack of coordination between civilian and military personnel activities. Since the establishment of the present Personnel set-up coordinating military and civilian personnel activities the situation has improved and it is believed that at present civilian personnel problems are being acted upon currently and satisfactorily.

Detailed problems pertaining to finance and civilian personnel activities in the ETO have been previously set forth in periodic semi-monthly reports from the theater. All pending problems have been discussed with the interested officials during my stay in Washington.

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
Page 2


It is felt that conditions in the ETO might be improved by:

1. Establishment of ETO budget ceilings covering operations in the theater during the fiscal year 1945-46.
2. Establishment of a consistent classification system in ETO for civilian and military personnel.
3. Continued review and analysis of personnel requirements in the ETO to obtain better utilization of manpower and physical facilities, with a view to releasing personnel and equipment for use in other theaters.
4. Close liaison with U.S. Embassies and Legations in allied, liberated and neutral countries on matters pertaining to civilian affairs with a view to stabilizing and strengthening the position and assuring the status of the OSS as a civilian agency.

Frank P. Bishop

*Am rendering classification under order
of imminent departure/ P.O.*





STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Maj. Trafford P. Kletts
 (SI/ETG)

DATE: 15 June 1945

1. From April to November 1944, trainer and organizer of SI field detachments for the First and Third Armies and the 12th Army Group, and worked with the French, Belgian, and Dutch Intelligence Services.

2. Suggests a table of organization for collecting Strategic Intelligence at Army Group and Army levels.

Sk.
 S.P.K.

Attachment

242
 1945 JUN 20 12
 OFFICE
SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

DATE: 6 April 1945

SUBJECT: Field Report - Major Trafford P. Klots

16 597
Field Report
Klots
SI
Field Des

A copy of the attached report by Major Klots has been brought to the attention of Lt. Comdr. McBaine, Acting Divisional Deputy, Far East, SI, with the thought that certain of Major Klots' suggestions may be of interesting value to our organization in the Far East.

Attachment

MHS
Whitney H. Shepardson
by S.H. [unclear]

Hold for Director
OSC

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

5 April 1945

TO: W. T. M. Beale, Lt., USNR
FROM: B. Homer Hall

The attached field report from Major Trafford P. Klets contains several excellent suggestions. It is recommended that Section 3, Page 2, be given serious consideration with the end in view of adopting the suggestions. Section 4, Page 3, pertaining to a suggested T.O., seems to me to be a workable idea.


B.H.H.

Attachment

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

April 4, 1945

TO: Chief, SI
via: Executive Officer, SI

FROM: Major Trafford P. Klets

SUBJECT: Field Report

1. On April 1, 1944 I left the 1st Infantry Division to join the OSS Field Detachment that was to be attached to the First Army and under the command of Lt. Col. Downs.

My first assignment was the training and organization of Field Detachments for First Army, Third Army, and Twelfth Army Group. On May 15, 1944 the First Army Unit was ready and the Detachment reported to the G-2 First Army at Bristol. On D plus 3, the morning of June 9th, the advance party, consisting of Lt. Col. Downs, myself and two enlisted men, landed on Omaha Beach. This advance party was far too small to accomplish the various types of intelligence work demanded. This small SI detachment spent the majority of its time decoding Sussex messages instead of contacting and working with the French Underground. Pressure was brought to bear on Col. Hickson and the remainder of the detachment joined us including the French liaison officer, who would have been of great use had he been with us initially.

Before the breakthrough many agents were put through the lines, but due to the tightness of the front, great difficulty was encountered and little intelligence was gathered by this means. The Army, Corps, and Division G-2's were extremely anxious to get enemy information in a zone approximately forty miles to their immediate front. As we were getting little intelligence from the infiltration of agents, a plan was submitted and agreed to by the London office that an agent be dropped in the vicinity of Avranches (Normandy) to organize members of the underground to exfiltrate through our lines. Approximately five of these agents came through the sector where the breakthrough was to be, and their information was of the greatest value as the armed forces at that time had practically no intelligence to speak of on this Zone.

SECRET

- 2 -

It is my opinion that if a front is tight and has been stable for some time exfiltration is the only means to gather intelligence needed by the Army in this forty-mile zone.

Just before the breakthrough Major Gale of the First Infantry Division (now with this organization) asked Col. Downs and myself for a terrain study and any enemy information we could give the First Division on the Coutances area. This was a rush order as the attack was scheduled the following morning. With the help of two French officers this information was obtained by interrogating civilians who had just left this area. The terrain study and the enemy information which was gathered was placed on a map. These documents were immediately rushed to the First Division and came out in the First Division G-2 periodic. Col. Dickson thought this periodic such a fine example of intelligence that he sent it to Leavenworth as an example. The First Division felt that this information contributed much to the success of the breakthrough.

On August 2nd the Field Detachment was withdrawn from First Army and attached to Twelfth Army Group. I remained with the Detachment until November 12. During this period the Detachment put agents through the lines and worked with the French, Belgian and Dutch Intelligence Services.


2. On our return to Paris a complete history of the Field Detachment was written by Col. Downs and myself and submitted to Col. Bruce in Paris.


3. I am submitting the following suggestions:

a. Members of any resistance groups in foreign countries should not be allowed to come out in the open. This applies especially to leaders of the resistance movements wearing arm bands, etc., as their services can be of great assistance to this organization again. On certain occasions these leaders who have organized the local underground could be used in operations behind enemy lines in re-organizing units which have been broken off due to military operations from their main channel of command. Men of this calibre are rare and it takes many weeks to train this type of personnel.

b. Army channels should be strictly adhered to, under no conditions should OSS personnel be allowed to go to lower units without permission of G-2 at the proper echelon.

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OBB Form 1001

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SA.

Watson

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Mr. Watson	216.5			DW.	Watson has been
2. Col. Byelow	4/10	10 AM		EW.	A considerable
3. Col. Mann					in his own field
4. Headquarters Office					and has advised
5. Col. Mann	2138 One				on appreciation of
6. Reports Office	2005 One				his chiefs. The above
7.					report fails to reflect
8.					the considerable amount
9.					of liaison work in
10.					Piday performed also
					at Bay in connection
					with setting up the
					Confluence operation.
					(U)

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

SECRET

To: Director.

From: George L. Piday

Subject: Field Report.

~~SECRET~~

On June 22nd, 1944 I left Washington for Cairo. While waiting for transformation at the Port of Embarkation, (18 days) my orders had been changed to Italy. Arrived there on July 10th, 1944, reporting at OSS HQ. at Caserta. After ten Days Mr. Warner, Chief of MO, sent me over to Rome. I stayed there 8 days, after which I was sent to MO-Bari, reporting to Capt. Fielding, who assigned me to the Hungarian desk.

My job was to keep close liaison with PWB, Hungarian Section, and to attend the weekly rumor meetings, also to submit our own rumors to the board. At those meetings the rumors were checked and discussed individually, and the ones which passed the board were sent to London for dissemination. I do not know what methods were used to get the rumors in to the respective countries. However one thing was evident, the rumors hit the spot. The Hungarian newspapers were screaming their heads off, cautioning and threatening the population not to listen to or believe in those rumors. It is my firm belief that rumors are one of the best MO weapons; it is easy to get one started from a neutral country or by agents inside in the enemy country and has a very damaging effect on the army and on the civilian population.

End of August MO-Cairo moved to Bari, Mr. John Fistere taking over MO-Bari. With him came Mr. Martin Himler, who was the head of

~~SECRET~~

DIVE

ICE

DATE: 22 APR 11 1964

S. B. L. Penrose
Acting Chief

02 **SECRET**
 14115 5 14 1962
 DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI
FROM : David C. Shaw
SUBJECT: Report of Victor J. Sjaholm

DATE: 12 April 1948

The attached report of Sjaholm is, on the whole, accurate. But it is not "puffed up" or too picturesquely written. Actually Sjaholm provided a kind of "cover" which others could operate under. Therefore, Sjaholm did more than he knew or could have known. Our type of work and our pattern of contacts necessitated close and intimate relationship with Swedish and refugee labor leaders on a representative basis. Sjaholm had this.

Des /w
Dav C. Shaw

Attachment

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 March 1945

TO : Director, Strategic Services
 THRU: Chief, SI
 FROM: Victor J. Sjaholm
 SUBJ: Report on Field Conditions

I have recently returned from Sweden where I worked under cover for the Labor Division, SI, since July 1943. The following is a report on my activities, progress of work and suggestions for improvement in the field.

FIELD ACTIVITIES:

I contacted Swedish Labor groups and refugee trades-unionists from occupied and enemy countries. I attended labor conventions of the various Swedish labor unions and also attended regular sessions of the local labor meetings; was speaker at many international meetings along with others, usually trades-unionist refugees; acted as Master of Ceremonies at several Swedish labor celebrations. I met and dined with Sweden's top governmental officers, including the Prime Minister; interviewed and was entertained by Madame Kollantay, Russian Ambassador to Sweden; and was entertained at the home of the Czechoslovak Minister to Sweden, Dr. Vladimir Kucera. I represented the United States Railway Labor at the Swedish Quadrennial Convention which had as its guests Norwegian, Danish, Finnish delegates.

I maintained an apartment in Stockholm, which was the meeting place or rather one of the meeting places for agents working for OSS, to which material was delivered and sent out. Meetings of foreign refugees were held here; and Swedish labor and political leaders were entertained here.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

16648

Field Report

Stalder

X. L. Lister

TO : Director, OSH
FROM : Chief, SI
SUBJECT: Field Report - Frederick J. Stalder

DATE: 21 April 1948

There is attached the field report submitted by
Frederick J. Stalder on his activities in Switzerland.

S. B. L. Penrose
Acting Chief

Attachment

file
BE

16648
18 April 1946

TO: Lt. W.T.L. Hoale
FROM: Mr. R. H. Hall
SUBJECT: Report submitted by Frederick J. Stalder

The attached field report, submitted by Frederick J. Stalder is an abridged account of this individual's extremely valuable activities in Switzerland. He did not feel at liberty to go into detail without permission of his immediate chief, 110.

He was the second OSS representative, under State Department cover, to operate in Bern. Speaking German like a native, and French and Italian with fluency, he worked for more than two years as Chief of the Code room at Bern, in addition to handling numerous agent contacts. He was also responsible for the coordination of O/R work and preparing many O/R messages.

His contributions to OSS operations have been described by 110 as "invaluable".


R. H. Hall

Attachment

SECRET

19 April 1945

TO: Mr. B. H. Hall

FROM: Frederick J. Stalder *AS*

SUBJECT: Activity Report of Frederick J. Stalder
from August 5, 1942 to April 13, 1945.

Upon arrival in Bern, Switzerland on August 5, 1942, I reported to Mr. Charles R. Dyer, Financial Attaché. Until the middle of November, when 110 arrived, we two were the only OSS employees in Bern and did all the coding and handling of information. Shortly after 110's arrival, we moved to a new building shared by OWI and engaged local help. By that time my activities extended to contacting personal agents, and coding and abstracting SI information. Permanent agents were established in various other Swiss cities and I acted as liaison man between Bern and the agents. These activities continued with emphasis on Battle Order information until the middle of 1943, when the coding problem became very acute for lack of sufficient personnel. 110 was finally able to obtain four interned medical fliers together with one American medical student (Frederick S. Coleran), to whom I could turn over all the code work and concentrate upon our various contacts and abstracting Battle Order information. In view of my knowledge of the local languages, I also handled all the administrative and personnel problems in connection with our office.

Summarizing my activities up to the time of my departure to the USA, 110 considered me as Battle Order expert and Administrative Officer, also using me for special secret missions from time to time.

I am expected to return to Bern shortly after May 15 and resume there whatever duties 110 will assign to me.

SECRET

D

OSS FORM #01a

Date 20 June

To: _____

Mr. Homer Hall, chief of SI-
French Desk, has copy of report
in his file and will send
additional copy to S/T.

SK
S.P.K.

Office of the Secretariat
Reports Office

(9139)

17/10/1951
 Note - 1/2 page
 This also say in
 the heading of
 report in form
 ke office one
 Director's Office
 Form 3054
 1951
 8/9/43

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat

DATE: 8 June 1945

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: 2nd Lt. William Duff
(US Army)

1. Lt. Duff of French SI was head of the OSS tactical intelligence team attached to 45th Division in the French campaign. He was wounded near Epinal in November.
2. His report is a graphic description of front-line intelligence operation and routine. Suggests that future tactical teams be relieved of performing miscellaneous duties for divisional G-2 and urges that an effort be made to thank and recompense the many Frenchmen who helped the OSS Detachment in its work.

S. P. Karlew
S. P. Karlew,
Lieut., USNR
Reports Office

Attachment

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, CI

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions, submitted by
Lt. William Duff

DATE: 11 April 1946

It gives me pleasure to transmit a modest and valuable report by an able young officer who contributed greatly to the success of the 46 Division, OSS Team.

A copy of this report has been forwarded to Colonel Gamble, a copy has been sent to Lt. Comdr. Potter, OSS History Section, and a copy has been brought to the attention of Lt. Comdr. Madaine with the thought that Lt. Duff's analysis will be of value in operations in the Far East.

S. R. L. Fournese
S. R. L. Fournese
Acting Chief

attachment

Hold for Duff
csc

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16, 657
Field Report
x Duff, Wm.
x Lt. & France
x Lt. & France

MEMORANDUM

2 April 1946

TO: Lt. W. T. M. Deale, USNR

FROM: B. Homer Hall

Attached is a rather lengthy, but highly interesting field report from 2nd Lt. William Duff. It is quite evident that Lt. Duff has hidden his own commendable operations, and has leaned over backwards in an effort to turn in an unbiased report. He has not attempted to color successful operations; neither does he drag red herrings across failures.

The final paragraphs on Page 23 should not be allowed to go unheeded.

BH4
B.H.H.

Attachment

SECRET

To: Mr. Homer Hall
 From: Lt. William Duff
 Subject: Report on the 45 Div SSS team

16.557
Field Report
x Hagg. Wm.
x J. T. Egan
x 45 Div. 45 Div
x 45 Div. 45 Div

1. There is attached for the attention of yourself, Comdr. Potter, Col. Gamble and Maj. Crosby a report on the activities of the 45th Div SSS team. Since it has been written entirely from memory it may contain several inaccuracies as to dates but it is believed, apart from this, to be reliable.
2. Emphasis has been placed on an analysis of methods employed rather than upon the enumeration of places, people and events because it is believed that some records already exist of the latter and that the former will prove more useful to you.
3. Should the approach adopted be unsatisfactory it will be appreciated if you will indicate what additional information is desired and an effort will be made to supply it without delay.

SECRET

-1-

Outline

- I - General chronological summary
 - A - Team heads
 - B - Team OP's
 - C - Team personnel
- II - Methods of gathering information
 - A - Dissemination and Recruiting
 - B - Civilian reconnaissance
 - C - Chains
 - D - Use of German POW's
 - E - Additional services rendered to Div G-2
- III - Examples of successful operations
 - A - Civilian reconnaissance
 - B - Chains
- IV - Untried methods
 - A - Radio line-tapping teams
 - B - Individual agent with small set
- V - German combat intelligence activity in the sector
- VI - Supposed relation of SSS Activities with Army G-2
- VII - Evaluation of Team's work

16,651
 Field Report
 x Wagg, Alm.
 x P. x France
 x 43 Div, 1st Team

SECRET

-2-

I. GENERAL CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

The Mediterranean invasion of France took place on 15 August 1944, with some of 7th Army G-2 SSS personnel landing on D-Day. A short time afterward the policy was put into effect of assigning an SSS team to each Div HQ rather than one large team to Army Base.

The first team chief assigned to the 45th Div was Frank Schoonmaker, who was aided by Lt. William Fitzgerald, Sgt. Peter Hogue, PFI Lt. Gaston Roux, Anne Marie Ribaud and Gilbert Pierrel.

Mr. Schoonmaker was relieved at Grenoble about 21 August 1944 by Dewitt Clinton, who was assisted by Sgt. Hogue, Cpl. William Clark, Pvt. John Pfonke, two radio operators and myself, along with French personnel including Lt. Roux, Mlle. Ribaud, Dominique Borghi, Tony, Lucius Filippi and Roger Nicolay.

Upon Mr. Clinton's departure for the States, about 1 Oct 1944, when the team was based at Epinal, I took charge, assisted, at various times, by Lt. Hogue, Cpl. Clark, Romeo Valague, Captain Robert Lutruix (formerly of SHU4), Sgt. Marvin Gellis (also from SHU4), Lucien Eastman, Ensign John Garnett, Pvt. Samuel Poletto and two radio operators. French personnel working with the team at this time included Pinet (Andre Beau), Lt. Roux, Mlle Ribaud, Annie Thinesse, Bernard Gout, Ginnette, Louis Benta, Marcel, Jacques, Gilbert Pierrel, Hellope, Denise Boileau, Joby, Marguerite Toussaint, Simone, Girard de Hallet and Andre Petronat.

SECRET

-3-

After 11 Nov 1944, when I was wounded, direction of the team passed to Capt Butrak, who carried on with Sgt. Gellis, Pvt. Poletto, Lt. Hognet, Mr. Eastman and some of the French personnel listed in the preceding paragraph. The team was finally dissolved about 25 Nov 1944.

45th Div 930 base was usually located near the Div CP but apart from it. Contact with Div was maintained through a permanent liaison officer from the team who lived at the Div CP. This position was held, at various times, by Lt. Hognet, Ensign Garnett, Mr. Eastman and myself. After Grenoble the team was based successively at Raume-lez-Mandœuvre, Verceil, Romain, St. Loup, Xertigny, Epinal, Gugnécourt, Ramberviller, Badmoull-aux-Bois and the Ferme de Gramment, near Baccarat, following to a great extent the movements of the 45th Div CP and later that of the 100th Div.

II - METHODS OF GATHERING INFORMATION

A - Dissemination and Recruiting

Up to about 1 Oct 1944 the team gathered information from many sources, including the FFI, civilians, the French and Swiss SR, the BCRA and our own operations, and submitted it to Div G-2 with the source indicated but under the SSS letterhead. After this date, at the pertinent suggestion of Capt. Justin Greene, chief of the 36th Div 332 team, who had a short time before been falsely charged with submitting inaccurate information about German artillery strength in his sector, the policy was adopted of submitting under our letterhead only information received from our own agents. This policy greatly improved the quality

SECRET

-4-

of our information and its prestige with Div.

The team's recruiting was done almost entirely from among those who had worked with the organization before the landing, or those belonging to the resistance groups. Five types of personnel were recruited;

- 1 - Guides or passeurs, who lived near the locality through which the operation was to pass. These agents, either men or women, who sometimes owned land on the front lines, knew every foot of their sector and were able to cross it safely even under difficult conditions.
- 2 - Radio passeurs. The team policy was, for security reasons, to send radios across the lines apart from the agents who were to operate them. This necessitated a passeur as in (1), but who was strong enough and courageous enough to carry 36 lbs. of hot equipment to a safe house well within German territory.
- 3 - Passeurs, or agents who were equipped to provide false identity papers to other agents and passeurs.
- 4 - Agents. These were trained in intelligence observation evaluation and reporting and possessed in addition a hatred of the Germans and a flair for their special type of work.
- 5 - Other French personnel who aided in recruiting, building up a system of safe houses and points de chute, or in the daily administration of the team.

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Of these five classes (1) and (2) were only temporarily attached to the team, because their usefulness ended with the liberation of their locality. The others were more or less permanently attached to the team. Service with the team, for French personnel, was on a voluntary basis. No salary or bonus, other than expenses, was agreed upon at the time of engagement, but when the work of the team had been completed, bonuses were distributed in proportion to the usefulness of the work performed by each individual. It is believed that this policy did much to eliminate the danger of double agents and of false information which might have been submitted solely in the hope of a stipend.

B - Civilian Reconnaissance

This was the first and simplest method of operation. In accordance with a directive issued to the team by Div G-2 an agent was sent on foot to cross the lines and return with the necessary information in time for it to be useful to the Army. Although this method at times gave good results it often proved to be unnecessarily dangerous and, especially during our rapid advance from San Tropez to Epinal, too slow.

Finding a hole in the lines was one of the most difficult and important parts of this or any other method employed by the team. As the first step in this process a study was made of the situation maps at Div G-2 to discover a sector where activity was apt to be slight, such as on a German divisional boundary. Locations of minefields and barbed wire were noted and an effort was made to postulate where the Germans might have placed other such obstacles. If possible a sector opposite

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Russian troops was chosen, for they proved easier to penetrate. Visits were then made to Regt and Bn Cps to study in detail the likely sector. A guide was then found who knew a desired sector and who was willing to cross it. This was usually done by recruiting a civilian who had recently come from German occupied territory, who often had himself some very good tips on safe route across the lines, or by getting in touch with the local resistance organisations. As a final check the team kept in contact with other combat intelligence organisations in the sector, such as the other G-2 SSS teams, Col. Booth's BCRA team and Capt. Hage's SR team to find out where they had been successful in running ops. After following this procedure we were reasonably certain of having found a good spot for a passage of the lines.

False documents were provided for agents if necessary. These were made by the team passeur if they purported to be from a German occupied town or, if for liberated territory, by the local authorities. They consisted usually of cartes d'identité and certificats de travail. In some cases arrangements were made for a mayor in occupied territory to deliver to the agent a certificat de résidence for his town, to be used in conjunction with a carte d'identité issued in liberated territory.

Passeurs and guides were given little briefing. They were told to observe carefully, report accurately and let the team draw its own conclusions as to what had been observed. Agents, however, were subjected to an intensive course of study in recognising German Army uniforms, units and equipment, especially artillery and tanks. They understood the value

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of a German infantry division and were well acquainted with map-reading and the use of coordinates in reporting.

After finding a passage in the lines, recruiting, documenting and briefing the agents, the problem remained of running the operation smoothly and safely. The best plan for doing this was found to be as follows. Div HQ was notified of the intended operation, given the identity of the agents concerned and the regimental sector to be used. At my suggestion Div HQ adopted the policy, about 25 Oct of issuing a pass for each operation, to be delivered by a team member to the Regt S-2 through whose sector the operation was to pass. This policy effectively controlled the numerous wildcat operations which had formerly been run by a wide variety of individuals and which had been a menace to security. From Div HQ the planning of the op was taken, during the hours of daylight to Regt, Bn, Co and platoon, and at each level additional information was obtained concerning the state of the front and recent activity there. A rendez-vous was arranged with the Platoon commander, a 2nd Lt., for some time late in the afternoon of the same day. The Joe was then taken directly to the front lines at the agreed time, thus avoiding his presence at many of our CPs and conserving his energy for the night. Before dark the terrain to be covered was studied by the agent and passer with the aid of field glasses and maps, and a final route was chosen in the light of all the information gathered or known about the terrain and the disposition of German troops and defenses in the sector. The party then retired to a safe place nearby and did not start out until after midnight, because experience had proven that between 0100 and 0400 German

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patrols were relatively inactive. The crossing was usually planned so that with even slow progress a safe house could be reached on the other side of the lines before daylight. The Jon, after crossing, slept for an hour or two at the safe house, got up and continued toward the German rear as an ordinary civilian. It should be added that an effort was made to run ops on dark nights when there was a slight drizzle which covered small noises. This method of running operations, used almost from the beginning by the 46th Div SSS team, is largely responsible for the fact that no Joes employed by the team were either killed or wounded in crossing the lines.

Early in the campaign the agent was instructed to circulate as much as possible behind the lines and to return after two or three days with his information. Later, teams of agents were sent out to operate on a slightly different basis. Once in German territory the team endeavored to recruit a courier behind the lines and send him back with a report on the first day after their passage of the lines. On the second day one of the agents returned with another report and a copy of the report for the previous day. On the third day the remaining agent returned with his report and copies of the reports for the two previous days. This method of operation was intended to result in a greater volume and continuity of information, but was subject to all the criticisms applicable to ordinary civilian reconnaissance.

Still later a third manner of operation was attempted. Arrangements were made for Ginette, who was in German territory at Paccarat to drop messages into the Meurthe river at 0600, so that they might be picked up

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about 0700 near Chenevieres, in the sector of the second French Armored Division. The messages were never received because the distance from Baccarat to Chenevieres was perhaps too great and because the weather flooded about the time of the experiment and swept away the nets which had been set up to receive the messages. Under other circumstances, however, this method of communication might prove to be practicable.

C - Chains

Because the preceding methods of operation were slow and uncertain, a change was made to the use of chains of agents organized with radio communications behind the German lines. This was the method previously used by SI for gathering strategic intelligence, except that a short range, frequency modulation, line-of-sight radio set, the Army 300, was used in place of the long range storage battery sets used for sending from France to Africa. Three chains were planned by 46 Div SSS, but only one of these was actually put into operation. They were to cover, respectively, the Cirey-sur-Vecoux - Baccarat - Reon l'Etape triangle, the Raon l'Etape - Colles - Senones - Moyemoutier sector and the triangle formed by St. Die, Senones and Moyemoutier. Extensive lists were compiled and verified of safe houses and points de chute in these sectors. Double transportation codes were memorized by the agents who were destined to transmit and they also became familiar with the operation of the 300 radio, a voice set, using the French telephonic alphabet --- Alphonse, Berthe, Charles, Denise etc. The radio was then sent ahead with a radio passour and deposited in a safe place, where it was subsequently picked up by the transmitting agent or those who accompanied

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him to aid in gathering information. At first, contacts were scheduled at dawn and dusk but later the sender was able to transmit every two hours at his option. Two receiving stations were set up on high spots as near as possible to the sender and arrangements were made, in addition, to receive from artillery observation planes, which could contact the 300 on KS frequency zero, in case contacts with the receiving stations were not made.

This method, while difficult and dangerous, because of the need for reliable contacts in enemy territory and the risk of transporting the set, proved to be highly efficient and indeed the only practical way at present of gathering tactical information by the use of agents. If it works at all it is probable that it will work continuously and well. It was employed successfully by 45 Div SSS late in October and early in November, at a time when the front had become so tight that receipt of information from agents had dropped to a minimum.

D - German Prisoners as Agents

The 45 Div SSS used a German prisoner as an agent on only one occasion. About 26 Oct 1944 a German soldier under the name of Josef Kleinschrot was captured by the 180 Inf Regt of the 45 Div. He voluntarily gave much information of value concerning his unit and then placed himself at the disposal of Col Cruikshank, CO of 180 Regt, as a guide for combat patrols. His work resulted in the capture of part of the staff and records of a German BN CP and of a German mortar ammo dump. On a tip from POW Interrogation we made an inquiry and discovered that the man was willing to work for SSS, motivated probably by his desire to bring his wife to the United States after the war and a dislike of

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the Nazis occasioned by the fact that he was half Polish. He was an infantry sergeant and a veteran of five years' fighting, intelligent enough to gather information but not intelligent enough to make a convincing double agent. With the approval of Col. Quinn, G-2 7th Army, and of Col. Reichmann, G-2 45 Div, he was picked up at the HQ of YU500 at Bains-lez-Hains and transported blindfold to the team at Badmenil-aux-Bois, where he was confined to one room. During the afternoon he was briefed by Sgt. Peter Weil of the 45 Div OB section to bring back maps and documents and information on the projected German line of defense behind the Neurthe river as well as incidental information on enemy units and minefields. The operation was run in the evening from a point about 2 kms South of St. Benoit with the understanding that Kleinschrot should rejoin his unit, get the desired information and return within six days. For unknown reasons he did not return, but it is thought that he may have rejoined his unit and been transferred with it to a rear area. It would be useful to check with the War Department to determine whether he returned to another sector of the front and was again taken prisoner.

In spite of the failure of this mission, this method, if good recruits are found and proper security measures are observed, should prove extremely useful in obtaining documentary and other inside tactical and strategic information.

E - Additional Services rendered to Div G-2

Early in the campaign 45 Div SSS was obliged, aside from these efforts to obtain information to render certain services to the Div G-2, Col. Reichmann, in order to convince him of our usefulness. We assumed

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from the beginning a large part of the responsibility for dealing with the Intelligence division of the FFI, a task which took a great deal of time and did not produce much accurate information. We were expected, from time to time, to interrogate civilians, either as interpreters or as collectors of intelligence. The team member assigned to Div CP was often asked to translate reports from French to English, especially those from the SR team of Capt. Hage (known as Capt. Humbert). He also bore the brunt of handling relations with Capt. Hage and his aides, who were supposed to work through us but who soon began to work directly under Div G-2, in spite of the fact that they did not in most cases speak English. G-2 received copies of all SR reports for the 7th Army front, many of which did not apply to the Div sector and were blown-up to seem more momentous than they actually were. Our man at Div CP, nevertheless, was expected to translate all those reports.

In addition, the team was asked to supply FFI officers to the units of the Div down to regimental level to act as civilian interrogators and intelligence operators. This was done by Mr. Ballaguer, but the plan worked badly because English-speaking FFI men could not be found. After two weeks' duty the FFI personnel was let go and Div G-2 adopted the policy of picking up English-speaking Frenchmen to act as interpreters and intelligence operators, after what seemed to us to be an insufficient security check.

During the early days of the campaign 45 Div SSS performed almost all of the services requested by Div G-2. As the Army's confidence in our work increased, however, we were able to avoid most such duties on the ground that we were understaffed and that they interfered with the accomplishment of our main task.

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III - EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

A - Civilian Reconnaissance

As an example of successful civilian reconnaissance an account follows of the operation at Baume-les-Dames, about 10 Sept 1944, concerning which further reports appear in 888 files.

The 45 Div had reached the Doubs river opposite Baume-les-Dames and had got Fox and George Co of the 180 Inf across, using a civilian ferry. George Co held the blown main bridge across the river. Fox Co held a road junction about a mile west of the town and had an outpost as far as a RR bridge about 1200 yds west of town. Heavy losses had been suffered in taking these positions and the advance upon the town was blocked by cleverly placed MG positions and enemy tanks. Div G-2 wanted to know:

- 1) Number and disposition of troops in and around town.
- 2) Number and location of tanks in and around town.
- 3) Route of enemy retreat, if any.

Upon receiving the mission, I selected Mout, Gaston, Roger and Marianne, briefed them and gave each a map of the city, which they memorized. The plan was for each of them to go into the town, cover one fourth of it and the surrounding fields and return with the desired information before dawn.

After crossing the ferry about two miles downstream from the city and approaching the George Co positions from the west, we reached the outpost at the RR bridge west of town at about 2200. There Gaston and Roger left us to circle around the town to the north, across the road to

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lure and cover the NE and SE sections of Beaune. Marianne, Kinet and I approached the city directly across the fields from the west. Many of its buildings were in flames and American artillery was interdicting the road to Lure and was also falling on the NE section of the city itself.

Proceeding cautiously we entered the town over garden walls and discovered a house which showed a gleam of light. The occupants proved to be French, old people and children, but they were so upset by the shelling that they could tell us nothing about the Germans, except that there were troops at the hospital. We left them and continued to the hospital near the center of the town, where Marianne entered the building, spoke with some German soldiers and nuns and came back with the information that the town's garrison consisted of twelve men and non-coms billeted at the hospital and four officers and a few enlisted men at the Kommandantur a few blocks away. While standing in the street discussing our next move we noticed a German sentry about two yards behind us, but he took no exception to our presence.

After further inquiries we were able to get back without being challenged to George Co OP and to report the following findings to BN:

1) The garrison actually in the town numbered about twenty men.

2) There were no tanks in the town.

We recommended that a patrol be sent in to capture the twenty men, and the CO, Col Cruikshank, agreed to this proposal, stipulating that the patrol should start from Fox Co OP as soon as possible. By foot and jeep we arrived at Fox Co OP about 04:16, but had to wait until 06:30 before the patrol was ready.

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Leading the patrol across the same fields we entered Baume as light was breaking. Two Germans were seen in the street but they escaped before they could be shot. Marianne, Vinet and I reached the hospital some distance ahead of the reluctant patrol and Marianne again entered the hospital, this time shaking the Germans out of their sleep and telling them to surrender for the Americans had arrived. They did. Vinet and I turned the prisoners over to the patrol and started up a Horch weapons carrier which had a 20mm flak gun in tow. Since it was then entirely light it was judged too dangerous to stay in the town, which was open from the North, or to take the time necessary to capture the Kommandantur, and orders were consequently issued to the patrol to return to Fox Co CP with the prisoners. We had no difficulty in driving the weapons carrier back to the American lines, where we immediately reported the additional information that the Germans had tank and troop concentrations about 4 kms North of Baume on the road to Lure. Gaston and Roger returned a few hours later with additional details on these concentrations.

The mission was a success and Baume was taken three days later. It is nevertheless evident that the mission was long, exhausting and too dangerous for valuable personnel. It was, in fact, a mission which should have been performed by the Army but which the Army was, at that time, ill-equipped to perform.

D - Chain Method

After the capture of Epinal 45 Div 533 adopted a policy of operating solely by means of chains formed behind the enemy lines, thus avoiding the greater relative risk of civilian reconnaissance and obtaining better results. As an example of this method a description follows of operation Mirabelle.

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At the time of this op the lines in our sector were fairly static and ran from Glonville, a French outpost west of Baccarat through Nenil-sur-Helvitte to Jeannenil, west of Ramberviller. Jacquot of Grandviller and Louis Hantz of Baccarat carried the set from Glonville to a spot in the forest North of Bertrichamps, a small town on the Meurthe between Baccarat and Raon l'Etape. They performed the mission by crossing the Meurthe at night 500 yards East of Azerailles, continuing behind Gelacourt to Merviller, where they awaited daybreak. Early in the morning they put the set in a wheelbarrow and walked with it through Baccarat to Bertrichamps, where they obtained help from a M. Gilles, a garde forestier, who directed them to a safe place in the forest North of town. They were both able to return safely to our lines.

In the meantime a chain had been formed to feed the set. Hellops had been trained in double transposition, and Ginette had been briefed as an intelligence agent, since she had been in Baccarat the previous week and had not only formed her own chain, but was in relation with others already in existence. Louis Hantz, acting as a guide, completed the team which was to cover the Baccarat - Cirey-sur-Vezouze - Raon l'Etape triangle.

They left from a French outpost at the edge of the forest facing Buriville (N of Baccarat) with a local guide named Pierre who knew that sector better than Louis. Pierre proved to be a bad gamble, for he led the party into a German patrol and then escaped to the French lines. The three were captured and held by the German unit in the

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sector for delivery to the Sicherheitsdienst at Badonviller. Louis had his own identity card from Baccarat, and Ginette and Hellops had false ones from the same city. Their story was that they had all crossed the lines from Baccarat to Glonville three days before, because they had wanted to get away from the Germans, but that they had been picked up by the French outposts and held for questioning at Glonville. After being questioned they were held at Glonville, were refused a laissez-passer by the French CO and were suspected by the civilian population there of being German spies. Their position at Glonville was thus uncomfortable and even frightening for such young people (they were all under twenty) and they resolved therefore to return to Baccarat and their families, but were captured by the Germans on the way back.

The story worked. The Sicherheitsdienst at Badonviller sent them with a German plainclothesman to Baccarat to find out if they really lived there. This presented no difficulty because Louis, who did live in the city, indicated to his friends that they should act like old acquaintances of Ginette and Hellops. The policeman apparently did not think to check at the Mairie to see if all the identity cards were valid. At any rate they were ultimately released under surveillance at Badonviller and put to work in a German bar. Ginette succeeded in evoking violent protestations of love from the chief investigator for the SD and Hellops occupied himself with ineffective carpentry work in and about the bar. Louis, with the help of the others, began organizing an intelligence chain among his friends at Badonviller.

At our base we received no news of the three, except that they had been captured by the Germans. Reparations were made immediately

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to send Minet in to get information about the three and to send out intelligence. He, guided by Georges, went in from the 36 Div Sector some twenty miles to the South. The sector used for the operation, which was held by Russian troops, was SE of Bruyeres. Georges lived in this locality, about 2 kms behind the lines, and had just come from his home when he was recruited for the job. Crossing the lines at night he took Minet to his house, and the next day Minet set out on foot, making Corcieux, St. Die, Raon l'Etape and Bertrichamps without encountering any difficulties.

At Bertrichamps he found Gilles and located the radio. Continuing the next day to Baccarat he discovered from Louis Hentz' family the fate of Louis, Ginette and Hellops. His next step was to get a job as the driver of a German truck which evacuated civilians from Baccarat to Cirey-sur-Vezouse, and he was thus able to visit his three colleagues at Radonviller and get the information they had gathered. This, along with his observations as a truck-driver, he radioed back to our base.

For about a week he was able to operate in this manner, using also the network of safe houses and intelligence personnel which had been prepared for him before his departure. He sent in all twelve messages which contained excellent and very complete intelligence for his sector. Col. Repiton, G-2 of the 2nd French Armored Div. was highly impressed by his work, as was Col. Reichmann of 46 Div.

At the end of the week, the French 2nd Armored Div advanced from Glonville, took Baccarat and Bertrichamps and rendered impossible the further utilization of the set, which was then situated right on the German front lines. Minet was able to get back to our base without

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difficulty. Louis, Ginette and Hallops, who were still at Radonviller when the French advanced, found themselves abandoned by the fleeing Sicherheitsdienst. Louis and Ginette got back safely, but Hallops was picked up by German troops near Bertrichamps on his way back to our lines. It was later learned that he was taken to Radonviller and Allermont by the German police, but by 1 Mar 1945 no further trace of him had been found. He is the only team member reported missing in all our operations from 28 Aug to 20 Nov 1944, and chances are good that he is unharmed. It is suggested that an effort be made to follow up his case and to compensate his family in case he is found to have been executed or disabled.

IV - UNTRIED METHODS

A - Radio line-tapping teams

Two other methods of gathering information by means of agents were not tried by 45 Div SSS, because of lack of equipment and of personnel.

The first method is that of tapping enemy telephone lines. For effective operation one German-speaking agent would be required to tap the wires and one local passeur to carry a radio and transmit to base. A good procedure would be to locate the tap on a main line and listen for a period of three or four days, living on concentrated rations. The radio would be located a short distance away from the tap and would transmit at agreed intervals during the day or night. This method is dangerous, because it is impossible to camouflage effectively the radio and tapping equipment, but if it should work it would prove .

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extremely effective.

The other method is that of sending every agent in with a small ten lb. radio, which would have the same range as the present Army 300. It was never tried because the radios, which were promised to us by Communications, were never delivered. If such a set were available it would be relatively easy to camouflage during transport and to hide at a safe spot and would enable each agent to operate independently and yet maintain continuous communications with base. Reception from Artillery observation planes might greatly increase the range of such sets.

In addition to these means of communication it is almost certain that technological improvements in this field in the future will make this sort of work at once easier and vastly more important.

V - GERMAN COMBAT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY IN THE SECTOR

Although X-2 is better informed on this subject than 45 Div 333 a brief note of what we know about it may be useful.

It seems that the Germans were much more active than we in this regard once the front had become stabilized around Epinal. The G-2 of the 2nd French Armored Div reported a German plan to dispatch 500 agents across their lines in a week. About two weeks later it was reported by one of our agents that the Germans at St. Die, the HQ at that time for German combat intelligence, were offering Fr. 100,000 to any agent who would cross the lines for them. At that price 45 Div 333 would have been bankrupt after its first week's operations. It was impossible to verify the truth of these rumors, but further inquiry may

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show them to have been correct. It is certain that German spies were captured in our sector disguised as priests and even dressed in American uniforms.

One reason for believing that German activities were not extensive is that it was difficult for them to recruit satisfactory personnel. There seemed to be very few Frenchmen who were ideologically in agreement with the Germans and even those usually demanded money for their work. Other Frenchmen who disagreed with the Germans and even disliked them would not act as agents, but their price was higher. The difficulty of working with this type of personnel is apparent. Our problem in this regard was much simpler, for ninety per cent of French civilians were with us and it was simply a question of finding persons of the necessary courage and intelligence.

On the other hand, a reason for believing that German operations were larger than was suspected is that the Germans were continually retreating and had only to leave agents planted behind them with radio sets. Control in Allied-occupied territory was furthermore much less strict than in German-occupied territory. The Germans were thus spared two of our main difficulties, namely getting across the lines and having them move about safely once they got there.

VI - SUGGESTED RELATION OF G-2 SSS ACTIVITIES TO DIV G-1

The 45 Div G-2 Section, exclusive of SSS, carried on normal intelligence functions such as recon and combat patrols, POW Interrogation, OR, Radio Intercept, Artillery observation and the recording and transmitting of this and other information received from military or civilian

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sources. The recon patrols left in general much to be desired, and information was very often not delivered in time to the units where it would have been useful.

Divisional intelligence work, excluding that of SSS, should have been improved and extended. Div should have had interrogation teams to question civilians who crossed the lines, to gather road and river data and to get forest maps from the local poachers or game wardens. Recon patrol work should have been better. Sabotage teams should have been sent out frequently with instructions to observe and report on their missions. The wire-tapping teams mentioned above should be under the direct jurisdiction of the Army. Interpreters and general intelligence handymen, familiar with the local language, should have been attached to the S-2 of each unit down to Co, thus eliminating the security risk of picking up unknown civilians to act in those capacities.

This plan of organization, if adopted, would leave future SSS teams free to concentrate on building up tactical intelligence by the chain method and strategic intelligence from Army base in the same way. SSS would thus be relieved from performing all sorts of miscellaneous duties for Div G-2 and the Army would be certain to profit by better performance from SSS.

VII - EVALUATION OF THE TEAM'S WORK

The record of 45 Div SSS could have been better, but it was nevertheless good. With more experience we would have saved time by not learning the hard way, but we did learn the hard way and got results which were praised by Div G-2, the Commanding General of 45 Div and the

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7th Army H-2. It should be noted that in all our operations from Grenoble to Strasbourg, we had no men killed and only one wounded and one reported missing. At a negligible cost in men and equipment the team produced a fair quantity of intelligence which was of substantial benefit to the effectiveness of the 7th Army.

It is suggested that some effort be made to thank and recognize the many Frenchmen who aided us in our work, in certain cases by awarding military decorations and in others by giving money or gifts. This should if possible be done by persons who were on the spot when the individuals concerned rendered their contribution to the Allied cause.

Mention should not be omitted in this report of those whose work contributed most heavily to the success of the French endeavor. It, Peter Hupuet, Romeo Delaguer, Lucien Bouteau, Andre Beau, Gilbert Pierrel, Anne Marie Ribaud, Jaquet of Grandviller and Louis Hents.

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